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The Strange and Curious History of the Law 
Used to Prosecute Adolf Eichmann 
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER* AND JULIA Y. SCHEPPACH** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The modern State of Israel was born of two powerful impulses. 
First was the dream of the Zionist pioneers, starting in the late 
nineteenth century, to return to the ancient Jewish homeland, cultivate 
the land, and create a new kind of Jew—strong and proud—in an 
independent state of their own.1 Second was the growing need for a 
place of refuge in the land of Zion for persecuted Jews from Christian 
Europe in reaction to the long history of anti-Semitism on the European 
continent.2 While immigration to Mandate Palestine was restricted 
through the war years by the British, with Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence on May 15, 1948, the floodgates were open for Holocaust 
survivors to enter the new country.3 By the end of the 1950s, close to 
half a million survivors of the Holocaust were living in the State of 
Israel, constituting fully one quarter of the country’s population.4 
Our analysis of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 
(the “NNCL”), passed by Israel’s first Knesset (Parliament) in August, 
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1950,5 will take note of the relationship between these two 
communities: the European Jews who settled in Palestine out of Zionist 
convictions prior to the Second World War—and built what eventually 
became the State of Israel—and the Jews who came as refugees and 
survivors of the Holocaust. We regard this background as essential to 
our understanding of the enactment of this law. 
This essay explores the strange and curious history of the NNCL, a 
law commonly associated with the prosecution of one Adolf Eichmann,6 
but a law that did not come into being for the purpose of trying Nazis at 
all.7 In fact, more Jews have been prosecuted under the NNCL than non-
Jews.8 There is no doubt that the Eichmann trial marks the crowning 
glory of the NNCL. Its single instance of use after the Eichmann trial, 
however, was, in many ways, an embarrassment to the judicial system 
of Israel. 
We first set out the legislative history of the NNCL and then 
discuss its initial use to prosecute Jews accused of collaboration with 
the Nazis and persecution of their Jewish brethren. We then discuss its 
application in the Eichmann trial. We conclude by exploring the 
NNCL’s use in prosecuting a Ukrainian collaborator, Nazi SS guard 
John “Ivan” Demjanjuk, who was extradited from the United States to 
face trial in Israel and then returned back to the United States after the 
Supreme Court of Israel reversed Demjanjuk’s death penalty 
conviction.9 
II.  THE NAZI AND NAZI COLLABORATORS (PUNISHMENT) LAW OF 1950 
A.  Purpose of the NNCL 
The post-war enactment in Israel of the NNCL springs from the 
insidious method used by the Nazis of recruiting Jewish and non-Jewish 
prisoners in the concentration camps to maintain order and discipline, 
and oversee the fulfillment of work quotas.10 Such prisoner 
 
 5. History: The State of Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/History/HISTORY-+The+State+of+Israel.htm. 
 6. Orna Ben-Naftali & Yogev Tuval, Punishing International Crimes Committed by the 
Persecuted: The Kapo Trials in Israel, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 128, 129 (2006).   
 7. TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 261 (1991).   
 8. See Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6.   
 9. See Jack Ewing & Alan Cowell, Demjanjuk Convicted for Role in Nazi Death Camp, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13nazi.html?_r=1. 
 10. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 129. 
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functionaries were knows as capos or kapos.11 A slang term originated 
by the inmates themselves, the word is attributable to various origins:  
kapo was short for kameradanpolizei or Katzet-Polizei (“head 
foremen”) or derived from the Italian word capo, meaning “boss.”12 
According to The Holocaust Encyclopedia, a kapo was the “[h]ead of a 
unit in a concentration camp. The term was also used to refer to any 
Nazi collaborator, although some kapos were not collaborators and 
behaved honorably.”13 In its wider sense, kapo refers to any prisoner in 
a concentration or labor camp given some supervisory function by the 
German administrators. Initially, the Nazis chose kapos from the ranks 
of common criminals and later, political prisoners.14 Jews were only 
appointed kapos in camps that were entirely Jewish.15 
Kapos were part of the day-to-day running of the camps.16 They 
ranged from low-ranking functionaries in camp offices, kitchens and 
infirmaries, to chiefs in charge of work gangs and barracks, who were 
expected to deal out punishments and beatings.17 All were, in a sense, 
collaborators in the system, and all were prisoners themselves—
ultimately subject to the same fate as everyone else.18 
Taking on the role of kapo could mean the hope of survival for 
oneself or a family member because of the special privileges the kapo 
received from the German SS authorities running the concentration and 
labor camps.19 Legal scholar Lisa Yavnai explains that for Jewish 
inmates, becoming a kapo “often meant choosing between the 
possibility of life and almost certain death. In exchange for complete 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Jozeph Michman, Kapo, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR. (2008), 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0011_0_10732.html. 
 13. THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA 379 (Walter Laquer, ed., 2001). Michael Bazyler was 
provided a handwritten note written to Toni Green, the widow of Jack Green, a Holocaust 
survivor from Poland who died in 1981. The note was written upon Jack’s death, reading in part:  
“Dear Tonka! Sorry we could not attend the funeral of Jack who I loved and respect[ed]. Being 
with Jack in two concentration camps I feel that I knew Jack better than others. Watching day by 
day how he treated the boys as a CAPO. We should of have more CAPOS like Jack and we 
would have more survivors. As a CAPO he used his love, his kindness but never his power. When 
the Gestapo was around his mouth was his power, that’s all. Jack risked his life that others should 
live. Let his soul rest in peace and let the Mitzvah [good deeds] he did be counted by God. ….” 
This essay is dedicated to the memory of Jack Green and other Holocaust survivors who risked 
their lives to save others.  
 14. Michman, supra note 12.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 148 n.75. 
 19. Id. 
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obedience to the SS, kapos received more food, warmer clothing, and 
better sleeping accommodations. These amenities, which were 
unattainable for the regular prisoner population, increased kapos’ 
likelihood of survival tenfold.”20 
A common refrain heard from Jewish survivors of the camps is the 
cruelty of the Jewish kapos.21 Survivor memoirs invariably include 
details of killings, participation in selection of prisoners for 
extermination, beatings, theft and humiliation imposed by Jewish kapos 
on their fellow Jewish prisoners. 22 A frequent charge is that the Jewish 
kapos behaved “worse than the Germans”23—and this statement, we 
believe, reflects in large part the bitterness and shame felt by the authors 
of such statements towards their Jewish brethren. It also reflects the 
reality of camp life under a system where prisoners would do much of 
“the dirty work.” On a day-to-day basis, Jewish prisoners would have 
many more encounters with their Jewish prisoner-bosses, rather than the 
Germans. 
The purpose of the NNCL has been hotly debated, as well as 
criticized, by Israeli scholars. According to one Israeli Supreme Court 
decision, “[t]he law in question is designed to make it possible to try, in 
Israel, Nazis, their associates and their collaborators for the murder of 
the Jewish people . . . and for crimes against humanity as a whole.”24 
While this purpose may seem straightforward enough, some Israeli 
scholars do not agree on the motivations behind creating this legal 
remedy. 
Israeli journalist Tom Segev, for example, provides a plausible 
explanation for how the NNCL came on the books. He notes that after 
the war had ended, liberated Jews who were recognized as kapos were 
 
 20. Lisa Yavnai, Vengeance or Justice? Trials of Kapos, Panel Presentation at the 
International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem, Holocaust and Justice: Post-War 
Trials and Holocaust Representation, Awareness, and Histiography (2006). See also Lisa Yavnai, 
Vengeance or Justice? Trials of Kapos, YAD VASHEM, 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/holocaust/insights/podcast/nuremberg_yavnai.asp (last 
accessed Feb. 17, 2013) (a slightly different version of the above-mentioned presentation as a 
podcast). 
 21. Michman, supra note 12. 
 22. Oliver Lustig, Concentration Camp Dictionary: Kapo, HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS 
NETWORK, http://isurvived.org/Lustig_Oliver-CCDictionary/CCD-08_K.html#B1. 
 23. Sarah Stricker, Demjanjuk's Lawyer Argues Jewish 'Kapos' Worse Than Nazis, 
YNETNEWS (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3823149,00.html. 
 24. Jonathan M. Wenig, Enforcing the Lessons of History: Israel Judges the Holocaust, in 
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 105 n.12 (Timothy 
L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997). 
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beaten in Europe, with some even being murdered.25 In British Mandate 
Palestine, the most serious acts of violence were beatings.26 With the 
establishment of the State of Israel, survivors, now living in a Jewish 
state, felt no need to take the law into their own hands and turned to the 
police. But, as Segev explains: “[T]he police were powerless—there 
was no law that covered this situation or allowed them to arrest the 
suspects. As a result, the Ministry of Justice introduced an ‘Act against 
Jewish War Criminals’ in August 1949 but did not push for immediate 
enactment [by the Knesset].”27 After ten months, the contemplated Act 
against Jewish War Criminals was introduced into the Knesset, but with 
a new name—Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law (NNCL)—and 
expanded jurisdiction, targeting not only so-called “Jewish war 
criminals” but also Nazis and their non-Jewish collaborators who 
murdered Jews. On August 1, 1950, it won Knesset approval.28 
Israeli legal scholar Orna Ben-Naftali provides a similar, but more 
detailed, narrative for how the law came to be:   
Beginning in 1948, a few dozen complaints had been accumulated at 
police stations statewide, although nothing could be done with these 
complaints because of the absence of an appropriate legal basis on 
which to act. The complaints were made by Holocaust survivors who 
had recently immigrated to Israel against other such Jews, charging 
the latter with having collaborated with the Nazis. . . . Work on the 
Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law thus began in the Ministry of 
Justice to rectify this legal lacuna and provide a basis for bringing 
such suspects to justice.29 
But Israeli historian Idith Zertal, while acknowledging some 
influence of initial survivor complaints, questions the degree to which 
such complaints by Holocaust survivors themselves motivated the law:   
The police were under some pressure from survivors—a few dozen 
all in all—who demanded justice and action against “collaborators.” 
According to this quasi-official narrative, the “predicament” of the 
survivors is therefore what expedited the legislative process. The 
Justice and Police Ministries joined forces to draft an appropriate law 
 
 25. TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 260 (1991). 
 26. See id. at 259–60. 
 27. Id. at 260 n.15.  
 28. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 154 (1950–1951) 
(Isr.), available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Nazis+and+Nazi+Collaborators+-
Punishment-+Law-+571.htm. 
 29. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 128, 144. 
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based on the complaints of a handful (out of more than a quarter of a 
million) of survivors against other survivors. Thus, a law was 
promulgated against “war criminals” and the perpetrators of “crimes 
against humanity,” which, in practice, targeted Jews, themselves 
Holocaust victims. 30 
Although it was no longer called the Act against Jewish War 
Criminals, everyone was aware that the main target of the NNCL was 
Jewish collaborators and not Nazis. 
A major proponent of the law was Pinchas Rosen, Israel’s first 
Minister of Justice. Rosen, born Felix Rosenblüth in Germany in 1887, 
was already an experienced lawyer when he came to Mandate Palestine 
in 1926, motivated by his long-standing Zionist commitment.31 Elected 
to the First Knesset, he was appointed to serve as Israel’s first Minister 
of Justice by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. In that 
capacity, on March 27, 1950, Rosen testified at Knesset Session 131, 
during the first reading of the bill and explained the need for this law to 
the parliamentarians:   
While other nations legislated laws immediately following the war, 
and some of them even beforehand, concerning bringing the Nazi and 
their collaborators to justice, the Jewish people, the people whose 
grievance against the Nazi is the most severe, was deprived until the 
creation of the state of the authority to bring the Nazi criminals and 
their collaborators to justice. . . . This will be changed now [with this 
proposed law] . . .
32
 
But Rosen acknowledged that the NNCL was not just a symbolic 
gesture by Israel to make what the Nazis did to the Jews a crime under 
Israeli law. If this is all that the bill sought to do, it would have been 
akin to another symbolic proposal being floated at the time (but never 
adopted) to grant posthumously Israeli citizenship to all those who 
perished in the Holocaust (the Shoah, in Hebrew).33 The real thrust of 
the law, its practical significance as Rosen calls it, came out at the end 
of his presentation:   
 
 30. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 62. 
   31. Gunther Kuhne, The Impact of German Jewish Jurists on German Law Until 1933 and 
Their Immigration Thereafter to the U.S., Israel, and Other Countries, 15 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 
67, 75 (2000). 
 32. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 143 (quoting and translating 20 PR mtg. no. 131 
(first vote) Mar. 27, 1950, at 1147).  
 33. See LAW AND CATASTROPHE 143–44 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, & Martha 
Merrill Umphrey, eds., 2007).  
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It is assumed that Nazi criminals, who could be charged on the basis 
of the crimes included in the Law, would not dare come to Israel. But 
the Law applies also to Nazi collaborators, and, unfortunately, we 
cannot be certain that such people would not be found in our camp, 
even if their numbers are probably not many . . . The proposed Law 
may also contribute to the cleansing of the atmosphere amongst the 
survivors who immigrated to the land of Israel. Whoever knows their 
problems, knows how painfully embedded in them is the question of 
suspicions and reciprocal accusations . . . the police could not, given 
the absence of the proposed Law, commence an investigation . . . ‘let 
our camp be pure.’
34
  
But which “camp” or community was Rosen seeking to purify? 
There are three possibilities. First, it could be the camp of Holocaust 
survivors living in Israel who themselves had recently emerged from 
another category of camps—concentration camps—in Nazi-occupied 
Europe to return to the Jewish homeland built for them by their brethren 
who came before the war. Second, it could mean the entire camp of the 
State of Israel, that is, the Jewish pioneers from around the world that 
shared the Zionist dream and made the decision to return to their ancient 
homeland.35 Third, it could have been a reference to the camp 
comprising all Jews throughout the world.  
Certainly, it was not the last, since Israel did not seek to cleanse 
the Jewish people worldwide of those who collaborated with the Nazi 
oppressors.36 That worldwide cleansing was not intended (putting aside 
the impracticalities of doing so) is illustrated by the fact that the law 
was not drafted as an extra-territorial statute that would reach out and 
punish also kapos that stayed in desecrated Europe or found refuge in 
North America, Australia, or other parts of the world to which survivors 
could emigrate to start new lives.37 The impurity of these camps was of 
no concern to Rosen.  
It would seem, taken at face value, that Rosen in Session 131 was 
addressing the community of survivors in Israel, and saying, “We are 
doing this for you.”38 He appears to be making this point when he told 
Knesset members: 
 
 34. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 143. 
 35. Id. at 146–47. 
 36. See id. at 144. 
 37. See id. at 149. 
 38. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 65–66 n.51. 
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Anyone familiar with the problems [of the survivors] . . . knows how 
painful for them [are] the mutual suspicion and recrimination that, to 
this day, hover over some of Israel’s immigrants who were liberated 
from camps and ghettos; in some cases perhaps—because they have 
not been given an opportunity to prove their innocence before an 
authorized court.39  
We are somewhat suspicious, however, that the motivation behind 
the NNCL was in fact to calm the wrath of the survivors and avenge 
their suffering. Out of the 200,000 or so survivors living in Israel at the 
time, the police received “a few dozen complaints.”40 A few dozen 
complaints do not amount to a popular demand.  
Rather, it seems that the law was enacted for the psychological 
benefit of the community of non-survivors, the prewar population in 
Israel. Its intention most likely was to distance Israelis from what they 
regarded as the shameful response of Europe’s Jews to their destruction. 
As Zertal explains:   
While the social predicament of survivors who found themselves 
sharing a new country with former petty tormentors may well have 
added impetus for devising that law, it seems unlikely that this alone 
would have set into motion so grave and complex a legislative 
process. . . . Above all, . . . as the early trials demonstrated, the law 
was meant to appease society’s disgust at “Jewish conduct” during 
the Holocaust. Israel introduced an anomaly into its legal code not in 
order to confront Nazism, not in order “to clear us of the shame of 
infamous Germany” . . . but to purge the new and “pure” state of 
Jewish shame. . . . Jews who had not been in Nazi-occupied Europe 
brought to justice Jews who had been . . . and conducted trials that, 
in every sense of the word, were purges.41 
The greater Israeli society, a majority of whom were not survivors, 
exhibited considerable disdain for the Jews of Europe for not standing 
up to the Nazi onslaught but instead, as the narrative went, meekly 
going to their deaths like “lambs to the slaughter.”42 Otherwise, how 
could the Nazis have succeeded in murdering six million Jews in 
Europe? Moreover, as Israeli sociologist Judith Buber Agassi writes, “In 
the early years after the War, all survivors of the Holocaust who came 
 
 39. Id. at 60 (quoting Rosen, Session 131). 
 40. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 144. 
 41. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 64–66.  
 42. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 148. 
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to Israel were regarded with suspicion as possible collaborators.”43 
Female survivors had an additional accusation thrust at them. According 
to Agassi, “In the case of female survivors, a most unfortunate myth had 
developed:  it was additionally claimed that some Jewish women—
especially young and pretty ones—had survived because they had been 
prostitutes in the brothels of the German forces, and that they had even 
been tattooed as such.”44  
Ayala H. Emmett relates her memories as the daughter of 
Holocaust survivors growing up in the new Israel:   
What I hated and dreaded most when I was a child was summertime. 
It was a time when the numbers on my mother’s arm would be there 
for all to see and people would know that she was a survivor and was 
one of the despised people. People like my parents were despised in 
Israel, and I was ashamed of them.45  
In the new Israel, the narrative adopted by Israelis towards the 
survivors, articulated by one parliamentarian during the debate on the 
NNCL, was that “had there been the slightest sign of physical 
resistance, it would not have been possible to murder six million 
Jews.”46 This narrative pitted Israeli heroism in the face of extinction by 
her Arab enemies against the perceived “submissive meekness” of 
Diaspora Jews.47 The survivors were scornfully referred to as sabonim 
(bars of soap), a reference to the widely held belief at the time that the 
Nazis manufactured bars of soap out the remains of murdered Jews.48 
And if survivors as a group were despised, then those who 
collaborated were doubly so.49 During the debate on the law, one 
parliamentarian expressed what was probably the view of others in the 
Knesset:   
[O]ne cannot turn a blind eye on the fact that collaboration is what 
assisted the Nazis to realize their objective. . . . “Collaboration 
applies to anyone who joins the Judenrat or becomes a kapo 
 
 43. JUDITH BUBER AGASSI, JEWISH WOMEN PRISONERS OF RAVENSBRÜCK: WHO WERE 
THEY? 13–14 (2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. AYALA H. EMMETT, OUR SISTERS’ PROMISED LAND: WOMEN, POLITICS, AND ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN COEXISTENCE 147 (2003). 
      46. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 147–48 (quoting MK Eliezer Perminger).  
 47. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
10–11 (1963). 
 48. Jonathan Cook, Israeli Firms Accused of Profiting from the Holocaust, NATIONAL (Jun. 
25, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/ news/world/middle-east/israeli-firms-accused-of-profiting-
from-the-holocaust.  
 49. See Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 148 n.75. 
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believing that thereby he would save himself. . . . If one was a kapo 
for two or three years he could not have been anything but a 
criminal.”50  
In enacting the NNCL, it would seem that the members of the 
Knesset were not responding with compassion and empathy for those 
who survived, as they claimed, but with shame that they did not resist, 
and a belief that they might have survived because they collaborated. 
According to Ben-Naftali, “For those who survived without putting up a 
fight, their very survival became suspect, smacked of opportunism and 
was certainly not worthy of attention, let alone respect.”51 Moreover, “If 
the Law could be used as a mechanism to cleanse this community of 
those members whose survival could be attributed to some function or 
privilege, the survival of the rest could be tolerated. As living/dead, they 
would be absolved and then absorbed into the ‘pure victim’ category.”52 
Ben-Naftali, unlike Zertal, does not explicitly use the word “purge” to 
characterize the purpose of NNCL, but the import is the same. 
B.  Crimes and Punishment 
Minister of Justice Rosen’s presentation before the Knesset and the 
first reading of the bill took place on March 27, 1950. On August 9, 
1950 the bill became law.53 It was “an odd legislative creation.”54 As 
discussed, the law was not conceived in order to punish actual Nazis, 
but, rather, their so-called Jewish collaborators now living in Israel, who 
were persecuted survivors themselves.55 However, nowhere did the 
NNCL define who a “collaborator” was and how that individual could 
be distinguished from a Nazi. In effect, by failing to distinguish between 
Nazis and collaborators, the NNCL conflated the behavior of both 
groups and appeared to equate their behavior.  
This, however, was not the only exceptionality of the law. It was 
also unique in its ex post-facto orientation.56 Unlike the domestic 
genocide statute, the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) 
 
      50. Id. (statement of MK Eliezer Perminger, Meeting of the Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee of the Knesset, Mar. 29, 1950). 
 51.  Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 148. 
   52. Id. 
 53. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law [NNCL], 5710-1950, 4 LSI 154 (1949–
1950) (Isr.). 
      54. DOUGLAS LAWRENCE, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN 
THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 117 (2001). 
      55. See id. 
      56. See id. 
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Law of 1950,57 the NNCL was concerned mainly with the past, targeting 
those who committed or assisted in the genocide of the Jewish people 
during the Nazi era. 58  
What follows is a brief summary of the various provisions of the 
NCCL.  
Section 1:  Crimes against humanity, War crimes, and Crimes 
Against the Jewish People. The NNCL introduced three principal 
crimes, enumerated in Section 1 of the Law:  (1) crimes against 
humanity, (2) war crimes, and (3) crimes against the Jewish people. 
Unless an extenuating circumstance could be proven pursuant to NNCL 
Section 11(b), which would reduce the sentence to no less than ten 
years, Section 1 mandated the death penalty for all three crimes.59 Israeli 
judges hearing these cases were generally denied any room for mercy: a 
Nazi or collaborator found guilty of any of these three crimes “is liable 
to the death penalty.”60 
Crimes against humanity, as articulated within the NNCL, are 
substantially similar in definition to crimes against humanity specified 
in the Nuremberg Charter.61 Similar examples of such crimes are 
enumerated in the Israeli counterpart: “murder, extermination, 
enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhuman acts 
committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, 
racial, religious or political grounds.”62  
The war crimes portion of the NNCL similarly does not stray far 
from international principles articulated in the Nuremberg Charter, 
though it is considered “slightly more restrictive.”63 
Crimes Against the Jewish People is a sui generis crime, with a 
formulation not found in the criminal code of any other state (there is, 
for example, no offense in Polish law of “Crimes Against the Polish 
 
      57. The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, 5710-1950. The law was 
passed by the Knesset five months earlier on March 29, 1950, after Israel became a party to the 
UN Genocide Convention. The emphasis of this act, as the name implies, was prevention of 
future acts.  
      58. LAWRENCE, supra note 54. 
 59. NNCL § 1(a), (b). 
      60. Id. § 1(a)(3).  
 61. THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, 105 
(Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997) (citing Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 284, § 6(c)).  
 62. NNCL § 1(b)(7). 
 63. THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 
61, at 106. 
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People”). Of course, the formulation stems from the confluence of two 
unique factors:  the single-minded goal of Nazi Germans to target only 
Jews for complete destruction, and the goal of the Zionists who founded 
the modern State of Israel to make it the haven for, and the protector of, 
any Jew anywhere in the world.64 The definition of the crime closely 
tracks the definition of the crime of genocide in the UN Genocide 
Convention65 but limits its application to only one victim group (the 
Jews), one location (Europe), and one time period (the years of the Nazi 
rule).66  
The NNCL then tracks the actus reus (behavior) elements of the 
UN Genocide Convention but limits these acts to Jewish victims during 
the Nazi era: (1) killing Jews, (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to Jews, (3) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about 
their physical destruction, (4) imposing measures intended to prevent 
births among Jews, (5) forcibly transferring Jewish children to another 
national or religious group, (6) destroying or desecrating Jewish 
religious or cultural assets or values, and (7) inciting hatred of Jews.67  
Sections 2–6, Other Crimes. Apart from the three crimes for 
which the death penalty was mandated (Section 1), the NNCL included 
a series of crimes for which the death penalty was not mandated 
(Sections 2–6). These included: crimes against persecuted persons 
(Section 2), membership in an enemy organization (Section 3), offenses 
in places of confinement (Section 4), delivering up persecuted person to 
enemy administration (Section 5), and blackmailing persecuted persons 
(Section 6).68  
Defenses and Mitigation. As noted earlier, for the three crimes 
enumerated in Section 1, those found guilty would be put to death, 
unless an extenuating circumstance existed pursuant to Section 11(b). 
Sections 10 and 11 provide affirmative defenses and mitigating 
circumstances to the crimes set out in Sections 2 through 6 (unless the 
 
 64. See id. at 104. 
 65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, No. 1021 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (compare “[w]ith intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, religious or racial group . . .” with NNCL § 1(b): “. 
. . with intent to destroy the Jewish people, in whole or in part.”). 
 66. NNCL § 16 (“‘[T]he period of the Nazi regime’ means the period which began on 
[January 30, 1933] and ended on [May 8, 1945].”). 
 67. Id. § 1. Acts (6) and (7) are criminal acts not specifically set out in the Genocide 
Convention. Act (6) criminalizes cultural genocide, excluded from the Genocide Convention. Act 
(7) is found in the Genocide Convention as a separate crime of incitement to genocide.  Genocide 
Convention, supra note 65, art. 3. 
 68.  NNCL § 1(b).  
  
2012] Strange and Curious History 429 
 
crime was murder as defined under Israeli law).69 The Israeli legislators, 
therefore, contemplated specific situations where acquittal or a lesser 
penalty was possible for Section 2 through 6 crimes even though the 
prima facie elements of any of the NNCL crimes have been proven.  
Section 10 calls for acquittal for these non-death penalty crimes if 
the person who committed the crime (a) did so “to save himself from 
the danger of immediate death threatening him and the court is satisfied 
that he did his best to avert the consequences of the act or the 
omission”; or (b) when the actor’s reason for committing the crime was 
“with intent to avert consequences more serious than those which 
resulted from the act or omission, and actually averted them. . . .”70 
Section 11 permits the judges to take into account two mitigating 
circumstances when considering punishment: (a) “that the person 
committed the offence under conditions which . . . would have 
exempted him from criminal responsibility or constituted a reason for 
pardoning the offence, and that he did his best to reduce the gravity of 
the consequences of the offence”; and (b) “that the offence was 
committed with intent to avert, and was indeed calculated to avert, 
consequences more serious than those which resulted from the 
offence.”71 These mitigating circumstances can be considered for 
Section 1 offenses, but then limited the judges to imposing a sentence of 
at least ten years imprisonment. (“[I]n the case of an offence under 
Section 1, the court shall not impose on the offender a lighter 
punishment than imprisonment for a term of ten years.”)72 
III.  USE OF THE NNCL 
A.  The Kapo Trials 
We do not know the exact number of kapo trials that took place in 
Israel. The records of these trials remain sealed and will only be opened 
seventy years after each of the trials has taken place. According to 
Israeli scholars, about thirty to forty prosecutions took place between 
1951 and 1964,73 but these are rough estimates.  
As for the verdicts, Ben-Naftali summarizes: “The available, 
though incomplete, sources suggest that fifteen of a total of about forty 
 
 69.  Id. §§ 10, 11. 
 70. Id. § 10. 
 71. Id. § 11(a).  
 72. Id. § 11(b). 
 73. See Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 150. 
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cases ended in convictions. The sentences tended to be light, and only 
rarely was a person sentenced to prison for a period exceeding the time 
he had already been in detention awaiting verdict.”74 Zertal points out 
that “not one of the defendants tried under the law was charged with or 
found guilty of directly or indirectly causing the death of a single 
person.”75  
In stark contrast to the eventual results, the prosecutor’s initial 
charges tended to be harsh, with a number of the known cases showing 
individuals being charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity.76 
We do know of one case where a Jewish survivor indicted for crimes 
against humanity was convicted of that crime. Pursuant to the 
mandatory provisions of the NNCL, he was sentenced to death.77 
However, as discussed below, it appears that this conviction was 
overturned on appeal.  
Despite the sealing of these records, which “lie like corpses in the 
obscurity of Israel’s legal archives,”78 some information about the kapo 
trials turned up in the papers of Asher Levitzi, a lawyer who represented 
some of the kapos,79 and in the press. After his death, Levitzi’s family 
donated his files to the State Archive, and the sealing order failed to 
include the Levitzi papers.80 These papers contain the judgments 
rendered in only three of the trials, and some relevant information about 
other cases for which judgments are otherwise missing.81 Relying on 
newspapers, however, presents another problem since scant media 
attention was given to the kapo trials.82 As Segev remarks, “Only a few 
trials were covered by the press, some not at all. A kapo trial was a 
filthy and embarrassing story, and the papers did not want to get caught 
up in it.”83  
Though newspapers had a choice whether or not to “get caught up 
in” these “filthy and embarrassing stor[ies],” the Israeli courts and 
judges sitting on them did not. Soon after the law came into being, 
 
 74. Id. at 160 n.125.  
 75. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 67. 
 76. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 153. No Jew was charged under the NNCL with 
Crimes Against the Jewish people, the primary charge against Adolf Eichmann in his trial in 
1961. 
         77. Id.   
 78. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 87. 
 79. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 151.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. SEGEV, supra note 7, at 262.  
 83. Id.  
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Israeli prosecutors began charging individuals with crimes under the 
NNCL.  
The Israeli legal system does not have jury trials. Professional 
judges, lawyers with long-time experience appointed to the bench, 
render all decisions.84 The pool from which these judges came at the 
time was the same as that of the Knesset: European Jews who 
immigrated to Mandate Palestine before the war.85 In fact, one of the 
judges to preside over a kapo trial, a survivor from Germany, was a 
member of the Knesset when the law was promulgated.86   
But writing a general law to prosecute perceived criminals is 
different than sitting in judgment over specific individuals and learning 
how their conduct took place under unimaginable circumstances. As a 
result, Segev explains, “[t]he trials required the judges to make 
extraordinary ethical and historical decisions that often fell outside their 
areas of expertise. They had to decide whether a man could refuse to 
accept the post of kapo, and to what extent the job required cruelty. 
They tended not to punish a person for simply being a kapo, only for not 
having been a decent one.”87 Ben-Naftali gives a similar account:   
The courts thus found themselves caught between a rock and a hard 
place—a position that helps to explain both the sense of unease one 
feels when reading the judgments and the consequential compromise 
expressed therein. Nowhere is this compromise more evident than in 
the discrepancy between the harsh language that the courts often 
used to describe the acts of the accused and the relatively mild 
sentence that they finally delivered. . . . Moreover, the accrual of 
relatively light sentences was quite typical of the Kapo trials that 
ended in conviction.88  
Segev quotes Supreme Court Justice Moshe Silberg, who felt that 
punishing kapos was detracting from the horror perpetrated by the 
Nazis: “It is hard for us, the judges of Israel, to free ourselves of the 
feeling that, in punishing a worm of this sort, we are diminishing, even 
if by only a trace, the abysmal guilt of the Nazis themselves.”89 In sum, 
 
 84. Ruth Levush, Features – A Guide to the Israeli Legal System, LLRX.COM (Jan. 15, 
2001), http://www.llrx.com/features/israel.htm. 
 85. See generally SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI 
JUDICIARY 47–76 (1994) (on the organization of the judicial system in Mandated Palestine 
through the formative years of the Jewish State).  
 86. See ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 74.  
 87. SEGEV, supra note 7, at 262.  
 88. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 160. 
 89. SEGEV, supra note 7, at 262. 
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despite the eagerness of the Knesset to prosecute these individuals, 
Israeli judges found it extremely difficult to apply the NNCL to actual 
cases that manifested the “choiceless choices” faced by individual 
kapos.90  
Let us now take a look at some of the more notable trials.  
1.  Enigster Trial 
The Enigster trial was decided by the District Court of Tel-Aviv on 
January 4, 1952.91 Yehezkel Enigster (also transliterated as Anigster) 
had been a chief kapo in the labor camps at Graeditz and Fauelbruch 
from 1943 to 1944.92 The available records show that he was charged 
with five counts: (1) one count of committing a “war crime”; (2) one 
count of “crime against humanity”; and (3) three counts of “grave . . . 
and deliberate bodily harm . . . to a persecuted individual.”93 As noted 
earlier, if convicted of either of the first two counts, Enigster could 
receive the death penalty.94   
Enigster was described in his role as kapo as follows: “[A] heavy 
man, a red-neck, dressed in a leather jacket and boots, walking with a 
wire-club covered with rubber, which he used to hit whoever happens to 
cross his path, whenever he pleased.”95 Witness testimony included the 
following descriptions of his behavior:   
“He used to hit us like a man hitting his enemy. . . . He would beat 
us for no reason.”96   
“I spent three years in the camps and never encountered a kapo 
who behaved as badly . . . towards Jews.”97 
“He used to lash with his club at the weak and the fainting . . . he 
severely beat any prisoner whose posture he didn’t like.”98  
“I was in 19 camps and the worst hell was when I was working for 
the defendant . . . On the day that he and 25 kapos . . . were sent away 
from the camp, people danced with joy.”99  
 
 90. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 173. 
 91. INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 540–42 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 18th ed. 1957). 
 92. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 71.  
 93. Id. at 71 (quoting Verdicts E (District Courts), S.C., 9/51, at 152–80). 
 94. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 130–31. 
 95. Id. at 167 (quoting CrimC (TA) 9/51, Att’y Gen. v. Enigster, PM 5712(5) 152 (1952) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Enigster]). 
 96. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 72 (quoting Verdicts E (District Courts), S.C., 9/51, at 157–
59). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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In the end, the court refused to accept Enigster’s claims that he was 
forced to accept the job of kapo and that he only hit people to stop them 
from fighting with each other. With regard to coercion, the majority 
decision stated that “[a]ccepting the job was not coerced and . . . if the 
job was not done to the satisfaction of the Germans, the consequences 
would have been no more severe than being put out of the job and 
resuming the life of an ordinary inmate.”100 The factual basis for this 
conclusion was not given.  
In a divided decision, the court convicted Enigster of one count of 
committing a crime against humanity and also of three other lesser 
counts.101 Nevertheless, the majority judges did not want to impose the 
mandatory death penalty and bemoaned that the NNCL did not give 
them a choice. It would have been better, they stated, had “the legislator 
left sentencing to the courts.”102 The majority pointed out that there 
could be no comparison between a SS German working in the camp and 
the Jewish prison-functionary.103 Moreover, they explained that not all 
crimes against humanity are equal.104 In the case before them, evidence 
was proffered that some Jewish kapos acted even more cruelly than 
Enigster.105 Consequently, they would have preferred a sentence of ten 
years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity, and briefer 
concurrent prison terms for the other offenses.106   
Judge Yosef-Michael Lamm dissented. Lamm was a former Jewish 
lawyer from Vienna, who was arrested in 1938 and sent to Dachau, but 
was able to flee in 1939 to Mandate Palestine. Interestingly, Lamm was 
a member of the First Knesset that passed the NNCL, and served on its 
Law and Justice Committee that considered the law. Lamm would not 
have convicted Enigster of crimes against humanity, but instead of one 
of the lesser crimes.107 He also would have sentenced the defendant to 
ten years’ imprisonment.108 Since Enigster, by the time of trial, had 
become severely ill, the judges unanimously agreed to recommend to 
the President of Israel that he mitigate the sentence.109 The Court 
 
 100. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 168 (quoting Enigster, at 178–79). 
 101. Id. at 173. 
 102. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 74. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 74–75. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 75. 
 109. Id.  
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reduced his sentence to two years’ imprisonment from the day of his 
arrest and Enigster died shortly afterwards.110 
Of the known cases, Enigster’s case showed the most brutal 
behavior by a Jewish kapo. The defendants in the other cases appear to 
have committed less serious acts.  
2.  Tarnek Trial 
Earlier, in August 1950, Else Tarnek (also referred to as “Elsa 
Trank”), stood trial at age 26 for alleged crimes she had committed at 
age 18 in her capacity as “block commander” at Auschwitz-Birkenau.111 
The state prosecutors displayed conduct bordering on callousness in 
seeking the death penalty. They did so by charging Tarnek with both 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, even though the most serious 
accusations against her involved beating other inmates.112 None of the 
victims was alleged to have died from the beatings.113 Furthermore, the 
position of commander of Block 7 in the female section in Auschwitz 
was imposed on Tarnek.114 As a result, it became her responsibility to 
“maintain order and discipline, to assemble the women for roll call as 
the Germans ordered, and to supervise the fair distribution of food. In so 
doing, she hit several women ‘with her hands’ and forced recalcitrant 
prisoners to kneel, a common camp punishment also before her 
arrival.”115  
The judges rejected the prosecution’s claims. Tarnek was acquitted 
of both war crimes and crimes against humanity but found guilty of two 
lesser counts.116 In their decision, the judges recognized the untenable 
position of the female kapos at Auschwitz and demonstrated an 
understanding of, and almost empathy for, Tarnek’s actions in Block 7: 
We must take the circumstances under consideration:  the defendant 
was placed in charge, against her will, of a block where 1000 
persecuted women lived. She herself was a persecuted person, just as 
 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 67 (citing Verdicts E (District Courts), S.C. [Severe Criminal (Files)], 2/52, at 
142–52). Lauterpacht gives a different date for the trial, stating that it was decided on December 
14, 1951. See War Crimes Cases, 18 I.L.R. 539 (Isr.). If the August 1950 date is correct, then 
Tarnek would have been either the first, or one of the first, to be tried under the NNCL law, 
which came into effect on August 9, 1950.   
 112. ZERTAL, supra note 2, at 67.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 69.  
  
2012] Strange and Curious History 435 
 
they were. Her functions were to take care of the distribution of 
meager and horrible food and to ensure that the inmates would attend 
the twice-daily parade . . . During the time the food was distributed, 
the inmates fought to get their portion, or even a double portion. 
Experience had taught the defendant that consequently some inmates 
would be left without even one portion. She herself experienced 
hunger as a result of disorderly distribution of food. The defendants 
battled against these disorders by slaps, which were the quickest and 
most effective weapon under the circumstances . . . there were surely 
times where an innocent inmate got hit . . .117 
Focusing on the mens rea of the defendant, the judges explained: 
“It was not proven to us that the defendant identified in any of her acts 
with the Germans . . . the defendant herself had been interned under 
much harder conditions since 1942, before she was placed in charge of 
other inmates, and suffered a great deal.”118 
Finding Tarnek guilty of assault and battery, the judges sentenced 
her to two years imprisonment with credit for time served. As Zertal 
observes: “The sentence was not arbitrary. It was exactly two years 
since her arrest; Elsa Trank was released the same day.”119  
3.  Berenblatt Trial 
Hirsch Berenblatt (spelled alternatively Hersz Bernblat) 
technically was not a kapo but served as a Jewish police commander of 
the Polish town of Benedin.120 He was brought before the Tel Aviv 
District Court in the early 1960s and charged under Section 5 of the 
NNCL with “delivering up persecuted person to enemy 
administration.”121 Berenblatt’s case was one of the last to be heard, 
filed before the Eichmann trial, but decided soon after the Eichmann 
proceedings.  
Berenblatt was convicted in early 1963 of having assisted the 
Germans in rounding up the town’s Jews for a “selection” (selektzia).122  
The most serious charge against him was of having “rounded up and 
arrested, together with others, dozens of Jewish children from the 
 
 117. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 170 (quoting CrimC (TA) 2/52, Att’y Gen. v. 
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 118. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 170. 
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 120. Id. at 76. 
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municipal orphanage . . . and [of having] handed them over to the 
Gestapo.”123 Berenblatt was convicted on the testimony of a single 
witness, “whom the court found reliable,” and he was given a five-year 
sentence.124 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court in 1964 reversed and acquitted 
Berenblatt of all charges.125 The Court did so by relying on the complete 
defenses provided in Section 10 discussed above.126 Justice Moshe 
Landau, who had earlier presided over the Eichmann trial, noted that:  
It [would] be presumptuous and self-righteous on our part, us who 
never walked in the shoes of those [who were there] . . . to be critical 
of these ‘small people’ who were incapable of transcending into an 
ultimate level of morality . . . [L]et us not delude ourselves that if we 
subject the acts committed by our persecuted brethrens [sic] there to 
criminal justice on the basis of pure moral standards, we would ease 
the weight of the distress in our heart regarding the horrid blow our 
people suffered . . . [C]riminal law prohibitions, including the Nazi 
and Nazi Collaborators Law, were not written for exceptional heroes, 
but for ordinary mortals, with their ordinary weaknesses.
127
  
 Another justice, Yakov Ulshan, concurred:  “[T]his is a question for 
history and not for the courts.”128 
4.  Pal Trial 
The defendant, Joseph Pal, was a block elder in a concentration 
camp between 1943 and 1944.129 Brought to trial in 1951, he was 
charged under Section 2 with crimes against persecuted persons. His 
crimes were described by the Supreme Court on appeal: Pal apparently 
“hit an unknown number of inmates during parades, and especially on 
one occasion, when he compelled them to sit for a few hours without 
uttering a sound . . . and hit whoever dared to move, and especially 
when he compelled the inmates . . . on various occasions to kneel and 
exercise in the snow.”130 In one instance, he purportedly “hung an 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 77.  
 126. See NNCL. 
 127. Ben-Naftali & Tuval, supra note 6, at 173 (quoting Barnblatt Appeal at p. 101). 
 128. Id. at 174 (quoting Barnblatt Appeal at pp. 95–96). 
 129. See id. at 162 (emphasis in original); see generally CrimA 119/51 Pal v. Att’y Gen. 6 PD 
498 [1952] (Isr.) [hereinafter Pal Appeal]. 
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inmate for a few minutes above the floor with a rope, which he had used 
to tie the hands of the inmate behind his back.”131  
Pal was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and the Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court’s conviction.132   
5.  Goldstein Trial 
The defendant was a kapo in a forced-labor camp near Osterowitz, 
Poland. He was also charged under Section 2, and accused of one 
instance of mistreatment of a fellow inmate.133 The alleged incident took 
place in a bathhouse located outside the camp. Since the bathhouse was 
not used habitually by the inmates in the camp, Goldstein argued that 
the alleged mistreatment technically did not occur in “a place of 
confinement’’134 as required under the NNCL. This proved to be a 
convenient way for the Supreme Court to dispose of the matter. Relying 
on what the Supreme Court characterized as a “common sense” 
interpretation of the NNCL’s text, the Court acquitted Goldstein on the 
basis that his acts took place outside the bounds of the law.135  
Ben-Naftali notes that “the fact that the court had to make bizarre 
distinctions between what is and what is not ‘a place of confinement’ in 
order to reach a sensible legal result—in this case, the acquittal of the 
accused—underscores the futility of the attempt to subject an irrational 
situation to common-sense analysis. . .”136 
B.  The Eichmann Trial 
The first Nazi charged, tried, and found guilty of crimes pursuant 
to the NNCL was Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann’s early service for the 
Nazi regime was as its “expert” on Jewish affairs and policy, building 
“alliances” with Jewish leaders.137 In 1938, Eichmann became the 
“expert on emigration.”138 From 1938 to 1941, the Nazi’s solution to the 
“Jewish problem” was the deportation and emigration of Jews from 
Germany and its territories.139 To achieve this goal, Eichmann 
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developed and manned The Central Office for Jewish Emigration in 
Vienna, Austria.140 The Central Office was devoted to the forced 
emigration of Austrian Jews and was described by British historian 
David Cesarani as being “a place of terror, where Jewish supplicants 
were routinely abused by SS men and Nazi officials so as to encourage 
speed.”141 Cesarani further explains that “Eichmann and his aides had 
absolutely no interest in where Jews went or even how they got there, as 
long as they left Austria.”142 
Eichmann’s role in the emigration of Jews from German territories 
led to his next position as “expert in mass murder and genocide.”143 In 
1942, Nazi officials held the Wannsee Conference in Berlin, wherein it 
was decided that the “Final Solution” to the Jewish problem would be 
the physical annihilation of European Jews.144 Eichmann, already an 
expert at Jewish emigration, was responsible for the apprehension and 
deportation of Jews to concentration and extermination camps.145 
Eichmann embraced this role whole-heartedly and it became clear to 
Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, that Eichmann “was 
completely obsessed with the idea of destroying every single Jew that 
he could lay his hands on.”146 Cesarani described Eichmann’s attitude 
toward Jews as “cold inhumanity,” allowing Eichmann to manage the 
deportation and annihilation of the Jewish population much like a 
“director of a multi-national corporation manages production and 
distribution of product . . .”147 
At the end of the war, when other top Nazi officials were being 
detained and eventually tried at Nuremberg, Eichmann escaped 
detection by the use of false identities.148 With the aid of Nazi 
sympathizers, Eichmann successfully fled to Argentina, assuming the 
identity of Ricardo Klement.149 Eichmann’s wife and children would 
eventually join him in Argentina.150 In 1960, Israeli operatives captured 
Eichmann in Argentina and brought him to Israel to stand trial.151 
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1.  Israeli District Court Trial 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann began on April 11, 1961 at the Beit 
Haam, or “the People’s House,” in Israel.152 Originally intended to serve 
a community center, housing a theater and a gym, the Beit Haam would 
now serve a new purpose—a court of justice.153 The building was 
retrofitted to serve as a courtroom that could accommodate hundreds of 
reporters, journalists, translators and spectators.154 A bullet-proof glass 
box was added to house Eichmann during the lengthy proceeding—it fit 
Eichmann and two guards.155 An internationally broadcast trial, the 
proceedings were translated and transcribed into English, French, 
German, and the official language, Hebrew.156  
The trial was the first to tell the story of those who were lost and 
those who survived the Holocaust, giving the victims a voice.157 
Deborah Lipstadt noted in her book, The Eichmann Trial, that “[a]t 
Nuremberg the murder of the Jews had been an example of crimes 
against humanity. Here it would be the centerpiece.”158 As part of his 
daily journal entry during the Eichmann trial, journalist Sergio I. 
Minerbi wrote: “This is the first trial that will be able to shed full light 
on the Nazi massacres and the anti-Semitic persecutions; among the 
many volumes of the Nuremberg judgments there were only six pages 
on the crimes committed against the Jews!”159 
a.  Initial Challenges 
Eichmann’s defense counsel, Robert Servatius, challenged the trial 
at the outset, calling into question the objectivity of the presiding 
judges, Israeli jurisdiction to try Eichmann, and the means of arrest.160 
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i.  Objectivity 
The panel of judges trying Eichmann consisted of judges Moshe 
Landau, Benjamin Halevy, and Yitzhak Raveh.161 Servatius challenged 
the objectivity of these judges, contending that it would be highly 
improbable that a panel of Jewish judges would be able to remain 
objective in trying Eichmann, a Nazi, for committing crimes against 
Jews.162 Judge Landau, speaking for the Israeli District Court, 
responded: 
We must reject the exception made by the defense regarding the 
objectivity of the judges . . . because while the memory of the 
killings shakes every Jew it is also true that as it is our duty we shall 
pass judgment based only on the evidence that is accepted here.163 
Judge Landau further noted that judges “are required to subdue 
[their emotions] for otherwise [they] will never be fit to consider a 
criminal charge which arouses feelings of revulsion.”164 According to 
the judges, the trial would “not be a ‘forum for clarification of questions 
of great import.’”165 That is, they were not there to decide on matters 
such as anti-Semitism and roles of other nations in their assistance or 
non-assistance in the Final Solution.166 Instead, their responsibility was 
to focus on Eichmann’s actions alone and his involvement in the crimes 
charged.167 Conducting a fair and objective trial was the cornerstone for 
the panel of judges. 
ii.  Jurisdiction 
Servatius offered several reasons as to why the Israeli court lacked 
jurisdiction to try Eichmann. Servatius contended that the alleged 
criminal conduct occurred prior to Israel’s existence, in a foreign 
territory, and against people who were not Israeli nationals at the time 
the acts occurred.168 Servatius questioned the means in which Eichmann 
was brought to trial in Israel, arguing that the proceedings were 
inherently unfair because Eichmann was abducted from his country of 
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residence without proper extradition proceedings.169 For these reasons, 
Servatius argued, Israel lacked jurisdiction to try Eichmann.170  
As noted above, the NNCL is a unique piece of legislation in that it 
expressly provides that it applies retroactively and extra-territorially. 
Specifically, Section 1(a) of the NNCL provides that a person who has 
committed a crime against the Jewish People, a crime against humanity, 
or a war crime, in a hostile country during the period of the Nazi regime 
or during the Second World War is subject to the death penalty.171 Thus, 
on its face, the NNCL provides that it applies only to acts that occurred 
during the Nazi regime or Second World War. The law also specifically 
applies to those acts that occurred “in an enemy country,” thereby 
expressly applying extra-territorially.172 
After Servatius made his initial challenges, Judge Landau 
responded by stating that “the court’s competence . . . is founded on 
Israeli law . . . ”173 In other words, the court was simply applying a law 
passed by the Knesset, and, unlike the Supreme Court in the United 
States, had no authority to review the law’s constitutionality. At the end 
of the trial, however, Judge Halevy observed: 
The objection that our law is retroactive and therefore illegal is 
without merit since the Nazis knew that they were perpetrating 
criminal acts, as their efforts to erase all traces can attest . . . From 
the point of view of international law the competence of the court 
derives from the universal character of the crimes committed, which 
gives every state the right to judge and punish the crimes in 
question.174 
In its written judgment, the District Court defended its competence 
to try Eichmann at length, citing English legal precedent.175 The District 
Court rested largely on the principle of universality in defending its 
right to jurisdiction.176 In its decision, the District Court provided: 
The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are crimes not under Israel 
[sic] law alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind 
and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offences against the 
law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore, so far from 
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international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of countries 
with respect to such crimes, international law is, in the absence of an 
International Court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of 
every country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring 
the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under 
international law is universal.177 
Thus, because the crimes were of the sort universally considered to 
be crimes, any nation would have the jurisdiction to try a perpetrator of 
those crimes. 
In response to the defense’s argument that the victims were not 
Israeli nationals at the time they became victims, the District Court 
stated that it is “the moral duty of every sovereign State . . . to enforce 
the natural right to punish, possessed by the victims of the crime 
whoever they may be, against criminals . . . [who] have ‘violated the 
law of nations.’”178 The principle kept in accord with that of universal 
jurisdiction—the crime was committed against humanity and in 
violation of the law of nations.179 Additionally, the District Court related 
that “[t]here is a tangible connection between the State of Israel that was 
created and recognized as a ‘Jewish State’ and the Jewish people.”180  
At the time of Eichmann’s trial, nearly a quarter of the population 
in Israel consisted of Holocaust survivors.181 Then Israeli Prime Minister 
David Ben-Gurion would write, “[t]he Jewish state is the heir of the six 
million murdered, the only heir.”182 As such, Ben-Gurion felt that it was 
Israel’s “historic duty” to those lost to try Eichmann in Israel.183 Thus, 
the connection between the victims and the State of Israel was viewed 
as tangible and real. 
Finally, Servatius argued that the means of arrest used on 
Eichmann were illegal and, therefore, trying him would also be 
illegal.184 Eichmann was detained by Israeli officials in Argentina and 
brought to Israel where he was indicted and subsequently tried.185 
Initially, Argentina objected to the removal of Eichmann from its 
country without the proper extradition proceedings, viewing the 
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kidnapping as an affront to its sovereignty.186 However, after United 
Nations intervention, Argentina and Israel reached an agreement—
Argentina did not pursue Eichmann’s return.187 On this basis, the 
District Court rejected any wrongdoing in Eichmann’s means of arrest 
and provided that the “two governments reached agreement on the 
settlement of the dispute between them.”188 Thus, Eichmann’s abduction 
from Argentina was not an impediment to trial in Israel. 
b.  Eichmann’s Crimes—Application of the NNCL 
The indictment charged Adolf Eichmann with fifteen counts of 
committing crimes in violation of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law, 5710-1950.189 Eichmann was accused and found 
guilty of committing crimes against the Jewish People (Counts 1–4), 
crimes against humanity (Counts 5–7 and 9–12), war crimes (Count 8) 
and membership of hostile organizations (Counts 13–15).190 
Section 1(a) of the NNCL provides that a person who has (1) 
carried out an act constituting a crime against the Jewish people during 
the period of the Nazi regime in a hostile country; (2) carried out an act 
constituting a crime against humanity during the period of the Nazi 
regime; or (3) carried out an act constituting a war crime during the 
period of the Second World War is subject to the death penalty.191 
i.  Crimes against the Jewish People 
Section 1(b) of the NNCL defines a “crime against the Jewish 
people” as any of the following acts, committed with the intent to 
destroy the Jewish People in whole or in part: (1) killing Jews, (2) 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews, (3) placing Jews in 
living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, 
and (4) devising measures intended to prevent births among Jews.192 
The first count of the indictment dealt with killing Jews. Eichmann 
was accused of this offense for his role in implementing the Final 
Solution.193 The indictment alleges that between 1939 and 1945, 
Eichmann caused the deaths of millions of Jews by deporting them from 
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Nazi occupied territories to the extermination camps of Auschwitz, 
Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Maidanek.194 The District 
Court acquitted Eichmann of crimes against the Jewish people for acts 
committed by others that occurred prior to August 1941, finding that 
Eichmann’s role in killing Jews did not begin until Adolf Hitler ordered 
the general extermination of the Jews in mid-1941, when the Final 
Solution was developed and subsequently implemented.195 
The second count of the indictment dealt with placing Jews in 
living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction.196 
Again, the District Court looked only to Eichmann’s actions from 
August 1941 to May 1945 in finding Eichmann guilty of subjecting 
millions of Jews to living conditions that would likely bring about their 
physical destruction, with the intent to exterminate them.197 The living 
conditions that concerned the Court were those of the concentration and 
extermination camps. The Court found that Eichmann deported millions 
of Jews to these camps and subjected them to sub-human living 
conditions, with the intent to carry out the Final Solution.198 
The third count dealt with causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
Jews.199 As part of Eichmann’s orders and actions to carry out the Final 
Solution between August 1941 to May 1945, Eichmann was found 
guilty of causing serious bodily and mental harm to Jews.200 
The fourth count dealt with devising measures intended to prevent 
births among Jews.201 The Court found Eichmann guilty of this count, 
holding that Eichmann had directed that births be banned and 
pregnancies terminated at the Terezin Ghetto between 1943 and 1944.202  
ii.  Crimes Against Humanity (Jews and Non-Jews) 
A “crime against humanity” is defined in Section 1(a)(2) of the 
NNCL as the “murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation [and] 
deportation of civilian population; and persecution on national, racial, 
religious or political grounds.”203 Counts 5–7 charged Eichmann with 
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crimes against humanity with regard to the Jewish population, and 
counts nine through twelve with regard to the non-Jewish population.204 
In this portion of the judgment the District Court focused not only 
on Eichmann’s role in the Final Solution, but also on his role throughout 
the Nazi regime. Eichmann’s actions, beginning in March 1938, are 
held to be crimes against humanity.205 Specifically, the District Court 
noted that from March 1938 to October 1941, Eichmann caused the 
expulsion of Jews from their homes in the territories of the Old Reich 
through compulsory emigration.206 Additionally, from December 1939 
to March 1941, Eichmann was responsible for deporting Jews from 
German-occupied territories to Nisko.207 For Eichmann’s role in the 
Final Solution from August 1941 to May 1945, the District Court found 
Eichmann guilty of causing the “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
starvation and deportation of the Jewish civilian population.”208 
The sixth count of the indictment charged Eichmann with a crime 
against humanity for persecuting Jews on national, religious, and 
political grounds.209 The District Court found Eichmann guilty of this 
count because Eichmann’s actions committed “with the object of 
exterminating the Jewish people”210 amounted ipso facto to the 
persecution of Jews based on national, racial, religious, and political 
grounds.211  
Finally, count seven charged Eichmann with the plunder of 
property of millions of Jews.212 The District Court found this charge 
difficult because the plunder of property was not specifically 
enumerated as a crime against humanity in the NNCL.213 Instead, the 
plunder of property, public or private, was enumerated as a war crime.214 
The prosecution argued that the plunder of property fell within the 
definition of “any other inhuman act committed against any civilian 
population” provided in Section 1(b) of the NNCL.215 The District Court 
determined:  
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[T]he plunder of property may only be considered an inhumane act 
within the meaning of the definition of ‘crime against humanity’, 
[sic]  if it is committed by  pressure of mass terror against a civilian 
population, or if it is linked to any of the other acts of violence 
defined by the Law as a crime against humanity or as a result of any 
of those acts, i.e., murder, extermination, starvation, or deportation 
of any civilian population.216  
Eichmann set up and administered the Central Office for Jewish 
Emigration, an agency that confiscated the property of Jews prior to 
their deportation.217 The District Court determined that this was done in 
an effort to instill mass terror and facilitate the deportation and 
subsequent extermination of the Jews.218 Additionally, the District Court 
noted that Eichmann was also responsible for the confiscation of Jewish 
property at the extermination camps, which was generally confiscated 
upon arrival at the camps or soon after the death of its owner.219  
Eichmann was also charged with crimes against humanity as 
against the non-Jewish population. In counts nine and ten, Eichmann 
was charged with crimes against humanity committed against Polish 
and Slovene civilians.220 They were from their hometowns and deported 
to other locations, sometimes including labor camps.221 The court 
reviewed documentary evidence that established that Eichmann was 
responsible for their “resettlement” and expelled the Polish and Slovene 
population under sometimes inhumane conditions.222 Accordingly, 
Eichmann was found guilty of counts nine and ten.223 
In count eleven, Eichmann was charged with removing and 
transporting Romani and Sinta peoples, commonly known as Gypsies, 
from their settlements to extermination camps for the purpose of being 
exterminated.224 The District Court reviewed the documentary evidence 
and found that, although Eichmann had a hand in transporting Gypsies, 
there was no evidence to suggest that Eichmann knew that the Gypsies 
were being sent to extermination camps.225 Nevertheless, Eichmann was 
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found guilty of this count for his involvement in the deportation of the 
Gypsies.226 
Finally, count twelve charged Eichmann with the expulsion and 
murder of ninety-three children from the Czech village of Lidice.227 The 
documentary evidence established that Eichmann was responsible for 
their removal; however, the evidence did not prove that Eichmann was 
responsible for their murder.228 
iii.  War Crimes 
Pursuant to Section 1(a)(3) of the NNCL, the District Court 
convicted Eichmann on the eighth count of the indictment—committing 
war crimes—because Eichmann persecuted, expulsed, and murdered 
Jews during the Second World War in German-occupied territories.229 
iv.  Membership in Hostile Organizations 
 Section 3(a) of the NNCL provides: “[a] person who, during the 
period of the Nazi régime, in an enemy country, was a member of, or 
held any post or exercised any function in, an enemy organization, is 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.”230 
Eichmann was charged in counts thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen for 
his participation in criminal organizations such as the Schutzstaffeln der 
N.S.D.A.P (SS), the Sicherheitsdienst der Reichfuehrers SS (SD), and 
the Geheime Staatspolizei.231 During the trial at Nuremberg, the 
International Military Tribunal declared it to be a crime to be a member 
of these organizations where the member held a position within the 
organization knowing that the organization was used for the 
commission of the crimes against the Jewish people.232 The District 
Court reasoned that Eichmann, as a member of the SS, SD, and the 
Gestapo, carried out the commission of the crime of extermination of 
Jews.233 Accordingly, he was criminally responsible as a member of 
these organizations and was found guilty on these counts.234 
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c.  Eichmann’s Defense 
Eichmann attempted to invoke the “act of State” defense, arguing 
that his acts were carried out pursuant to government orders. The 
principle provides that a “sovereign State has no dominion over, and 
does not sit in judgment upon, another sovereign State, and deduces 
therefrom that a State may not try a person for a criminal act that 
constitutes an ‘act of State’ of another State, without the consent of such 
other State to that person’s trial.”235 Thus, if Eichmann’s actions were 
considered “acts of State” then Israel could not hold Eichmann 
criminally liable for those acts. Instead, Israel would have to settle its 
grievances over the acts committed (or complained of) with Germany 
itself.  
The District Court, following the holding of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, denied Eichmann’s defense that his 
involvement in the Final Solution was pursuant to an “act of State.”236 
At Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal rejected the Nazi 
defendants’ contention that they were acting pursuant to an “act of 
State.”237 This decision by Nuremberg was “unanimously affirmed by 
the United Nations Assembly in its Resolution of 11 December 1946,” 
which provides: “[t]he fact that a person who committed an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or 
responsible Government official does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law.”238 Since crimes against humanity 
are crimes under international law, as a responsible government official, 
Eichmann was not relieved from culpability for his role in the Final 
Solution.  
Eichmann also asserted that he was acting pursuant to orders from 
his superiors.239 However, the evidence throughout the trial suggested 
the contrary. In The Eichmann Trial Diary, Sergio I. Minerbi noted that 
various documents had been introduced into evidence establishing that 
Eichmann himself was responsible for the deportation of many Jews.240 
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In response to a foreign government, inquiring about one of its Jewish 
citizens in German-occupied territory, Eichmann declared, “I cannot 
allow the Jew without a country…to Emigrate to Switzerland.”241 To 
this Minerbi noted:  “Here therefore was the person with the power to 
make a decision!”242  
Though Eichmann attempted to portray himself as a mere 
instrument of the Final Solution, the evidence suggested that Eichmann 
played a much more zealous role than that. Accordingly, the District 
Court rejected Eichmann’s defense, stating at the end of the trial: 
The defendant’s main defense rests on the claim that he was merely 
executing orders from his superiors and that his entire upbringing led 
him to believe that blind obedience was a supreme duty. But the law 
doesn’t accept such a justification and the defendant cannot escape 
from his responsibility for the crimes that were committed even if he 
carried them out as orders coming from the authorities. . . . 
Eichmann never showed any pity for the victims. On the contrary, he 
was an enthusiastic executioner, a fanatical Nazi deeply convinced 
that he was accomplishing an important national mission. But blind 
obedience wouldn’t have been enough; the key positions he held 
required a lot of initiative, thinking, and organizational skill. The 
defendant was therefore entirely dedicated to his action and was 
happy to have done good work by sending the Jews to their death.243 
The District Court convicted Eichmann on all counts of the 
indictment and sentenced him to death.244 
2.  Eichmann’s Appeal to Israel’s High Court of Justice 
Eichmann appealed his conviction and sentence to Israel’s 
Supreme Court, which was acting as the High Court of Justice.245 The 
High Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling, reiterating many of the 
legal bases used by the District Court.246 Servatius raised similar 
arguments to the objections he raised at the trial level: 
(1) That the NNCL was ex post facto legislation, enacted by the 
State of Israel for the commission of acts that occurred prior to its 
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existence. Accordingly, Servatius argued that the act only applied to 
Israeli nationals and not Eichmann;247 
(2) That the offenses Eichmann was convicted of were “extra-
territorial” because they were committed outside the territory of the 
State of Israel by a citizen of a foreign state. Although the NNCL 
specifically conferred jurisdiction to these matters, Servatius argued, in 
so doing, the NNCL conflicted with “the principle of territorial 
sovereignty” which maintains that jurisdiction belongs to the country 
where the acts were committed or where the defendant is a citizen. 
Thus, jurisdiction would be appropriate elsewhere;248 
(3) That the actions Eichmann undertook were “acts of State” and, 
therefore, Eichmann should not be personally responsible for their 
commission;249 
(4) That Eichmann was brought to trial in Israel unwillingly and 
“without the consent of the country of his residence, (Argentina)”; and 
(5) That the District Court judges, as Jews, were “psychologically 
incapable” of giving Eichmann, a Nazi, an objective trial.250 
The High Court rejected all of these arguments, providing at the 
outset: 
The District Court has in its judgment dealt with [these] contentions 
in an exhaustive, profound and most convincing manner. We should 
say at once that we fully concur, without hesitation or reserve, in all 
its conclusions and reasons, because they are fully supported by 
copious judicial precedents cited in the body of the judgment and by 
the abundant proof culled and abstracted from the monumental mass 
of evidence produced to the Court.251 
The High Court went on to state: 
[W]ere it not for the grave outcome of the decision of the Court  
which constitutes the subject of the appeal, we would have seen no 
need whatever to  give a reasoned opinion separately and in our own 
language—as we contemplate doing—since the conclusions of the 
District Court rest on solid foundations.252 
Nevertheless, the High Court proceeded with its opinion on the 
arguments raised.  
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Ex Post Facto Law and Extra Territorial Offenses. Servatius 
argued that the NNCL’s validity was limited to Israeli citizens because 
the law was enacted to punish acts that occurred prior to the State of 
Israel being formed.253 Additionally, Servatius argued that the NNCL’s 
jurisdiction over acts that occurred on foreign ground was in conflict 
with international law and the principle of territorial sovereignty.254 The 
High Court grouped these arguments into one common argument; 
namely, that the NNCL is improper because it conflicts with 
international law in that it applies retroactively and to acts that occurred 
on foreign soil and with foreign citizens.255 
In response to these claims, the High Court examined the gamut of 
international and English law, as Israeli law was founded upon their 
model.256 In so doing, the Court examined whether international law 
would object to retroactive laws or to laws that apply extra-territorially. 
As to both, the Court determined that there was no rule in international 
law prohibiting the enactment of laws that apply retroactively, nor 
prohibiting the enactment of a law that applies to acts committed on 
foreign soil, by a foreign national.257 This was not a sufficient 
justification for the Court, however, as it also sought to establish that 
the NNCL was consistent with existing international law and not valid 
merely because of a lacking in international jurisprudence.258 
The Court explained that in enacting the NNCL, the Knesset only 
sought to apply international principles to Israeli law.259 The High Court 
reiterated what the District Court had pointed out—the crimes in 
question have consistently been prohibited by international law and as 
such are universal in character.260 Due to the “universal character of 
these crimes,” the Court explained, each State has the power and 
authority to “try and punish anyone who participated in their 
commission.”261 
Acts of State. The High Court rejected the contention that 
Eichmann was merely acting pursuant to an “act of State.” The Court 
reiterated that the Act of State doctrine is inapplicable when the act is 
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prohibited by international law, or the “law of nations.”262 This is 
especially so when the acts are crimes in the area of “crimes against 
humanity.”263 The High Court provided: 
Of such heinous acts it must be said that . . . they are completely 
outside the ‘sovereign’ jurisdiction of the State that ordered or 
ratified their commission, and therefore those who participated in 
such acts must personally account for them and cannot seek shelter 
behind the official character of their task or mission, or behind the 
‘Laws’ of the State by virtue of which they purported to act.264 
Within this framework, Eichmann also asserted a defense of 
obeying superior orders. That is, Eichmann contended that he merely 
acted on orders from his superiors. The “obeying orders” defense differs 
from the Act of State defense in that it permits the doer of the act to 
justify his actions because (1) he was following orders from his 
superior, (2) the order given was within the scope of the doer’s duties, 
and (3) the order did not permit for any deviation or discretion.265 The 
Court determined that this defense could not apply to Eichmann because 
it was clear from the evidence that Eichmann—on multiple occasions—
exceeded his orders and acted independently of them.266 
Abduction. Servatius argued that Eichmann was brought to Israel 
against his will, without the consent of Argentina, Eichmann’s country 
of residence, and by agents of the Israeli government.267 On appeal, the 
High Court affirmed the District Court’s findings that absent an 
extradition agreement between Israel and Argentina, the courts will not 
investigate how a defendant was brought before it.268 Additionally, even 
if a State’s sovereignty had been violated, the State might nevertheless 
waive its claim for the return of the offender.269 In Eichmann’s case, no 
extradition agreement was in place, and after the abduction had been 
publicized, the United Nations issued a statement, which indicated that 
Argentina and Israel had settled the matter, effectively waiving any 
claim Argentina had over Eichmann’s removal from its territory.270 
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Objectivity. As to the final contention that the District Court judges 
were “psychologically incapable” of rendering an objective decision, 
the High Court stated simply that the District Court judges “fulfil[led] 
their dut[ies]—fully and to the end.”271 
With the High Court affirming the District Court’s conviction and 
death sentence, Eichmann appealed to Israeli President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi 
to commute his death sentence.272 Eichmann’s appeal was rejected. On 
May 31, 1962, Eichmann was hanged shortly after midnight at Ramla 
Prison, Israel’s first and only execution.273 
C.  The Demjanjuk Trial 
The only other person to be sentenced to death in Israel besides 
Eichmann was John Demjanjuk, with his conviction and sentence also 
coming about through the application of the NNCL.274 Unlike 
Eichmann, however, the sentence against Demjanjuk was never carried 
out. On May 12, 2011, Demjanjuk, at age 91, was convicted under 
German law for participating in the killing of 28,000 people at the 
Sobibor concentration camp, where he served as a guard.275 Demjanjuk 
was given a five-year sentence, but was released from pretrial detention 
pending the appeal of his conviction.276  On March 17, 2012, less than 
one year after his conviction, Demjanjuk died in the nursing home 
where he resided while he awaited the outcome of his appeal.277 
1.  Background 
John “Ivan” Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian, served in the Soviet Red 
Army during World War II.278 In May 1942, Demjanjuk became a 
prisoner of war when he was captured by German troops at the battle of 
Kerch.279 As a prisoner of war, Demjanjuk served as an SS 
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(Schutzstaffel) Wachmann (guard) in the Trawniki Unit at the Sobibor 
concentration camp.280 However, it was also alleged that Demjanjuk was 
“Ivan the Terrible,” a notoriously brutal Wachmann who operated the 
gas chambers at the extermination camp at Treblinka.281 After the war, 
Demjanjuk immigrated to the United States, became a naturalized 
citizen in 1958, and made a life in a Cleveland, Ohio suburb working at 
a Ford auto plant.282 In 1977, the Treblinka allegations would change 
Demjanjuk’s life forever. 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) began 
investigating Demjanjuk in 1975.283 In 1977, the DOJ initiated 
denaturalization proceedings, asserting that Demjanjuk falsified 
immigration and citizenship papers to hide his service in World War 
II.284 Specifically, the DOJ argued that Demjanjuk tried to hide his 
involvement at the Treblinka extermination camp.285 The DOJ’s 
evidence of Demjanjuk’s involvement at Treblinka consisted primarily 
of the eyewitness testimony of Jewish survivors.286 
In 1981, Demjanjuk was stripped of his of US citizenship.287 At 
this time, the State of Israel requested Demjanjuk’s extradition so that 
he could stand trial for crimes against the Jewish people and crimes 
against humanity pursuant to the NNCL.288 The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, with the Sixth Circuit affirming, 
entered an order certifying that Demjanjuk was subject to extradition 
pursuant to the United States-Israel Extradition Treaty.289 Thus, in 1986, 
Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel.290 
2.  Extradition—Demjanjuk Challenges Israeli Jurisdiction 
Israel’s extradition request charged Demjanjuk with murder, 
manslaughter, and malicious wounding.291 The United States district 
court determined that the alleged crimes were within the framework of 
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the NNCL.292 At the extradition proceedings, Demjanjuk challenged 
Israel’s jurisdiction to try him for the alleged crimes. The district court 
responded by stating, “Israeli jurisdiction does not violate United States 
jurisdictional principles or practices in any way.”293 The district court 
provided that, “Israeli courts have recognized their jurisdiction to bring 
to trial war criminals for extraterritorial crimes, pursuant to the Nazi 
statute. [Citations omitted] Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction over 
respondent is certainly proper under Israeli law.”294 
The district court indicated that, “Israel’s assertion of jurisdiction 
over respondent based on the Nazi statute conforms with the 
international law principles of ‘universal jurisdiction.’”295 The district 
court reiterated that crimes such as those against humanity or war 
crimes are universal in nature, thereby giving numerous sovereigns the 
opportunity for jurisdiction, provided their municipal law concurs.296 
Demjanjuk argued that extradition would be improper because the 
NNCL applied retroactively, and as such, was violative of international 
law.297 The district court held that the NNCL was not an ex post facto 
law because “[t]he Israeli statute does not declare unlawful what had 
been lawful before; rather, it provides a new forum in which to bring to 
trial persons for conduct previously recognized as criminal.”298 
The United States district court essentially agreed with the portion 
of the Eichmann decision pertaining to jurisdiction, and permitted the 
extradition of Demjanjuk.299 
3.  The Court Proceedings in Israel 
a.  The Trial 
In 1987, the State of Israel began its case against Demjanjuk.300 
The indictment charged Demjanjuk with (1) crimes against the Jewish 
people, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) war crimes, and (4) crimes 
against persecuted people pursuant to the NNCL.301 The basis for these 
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charges stemmed from the belief that Demjanjuk was the person known 
as Ivan Grozny, or “Ivan the Terrible.”302 Ivan the Terrible served at the 
Treblinka extermination camp, with his primary duty being the 
operation of the gas chambers, which involved operating the engine and 
supplying the gas.303 For Ivan the Terrible, operating the gas chambers 
was not a sufficient cruelty; it became common for him to stand along 
the path where victims would enter the gas chambers and “beat them 
with deadly weapons, with swords, iron bars, and whips.”304 When the 
gas chamber became full, Ivan would shove the remaining victims in by 
force, closing and sealing the door behind them.305 Ivan earned his 
nickname “the Terrible” for his brutality and “enthusiasm . . . in helping 
the Germans carry out the extermination.”306 Ivan the Terrible was 
described as having a “murderous lust to kill, annihilate and destroy, as 
well as to deal brutally with his victims. . . .”307  
In response to the indictment, and throughout the proceedings, 
Demjanjuk maintained that he was not the notorious Ivan the Terrible, 
that he never served at Treblinka, and that he was merely a captive 
prisoner of war.308 The prosecution introduced the testimony of five 
Treblinka survivors and one German guard who identified Demjanjuk 
as Ivan the Terrible.309 Demjanjuk challenged the reliability of the 
testimony—with eyewitness testimony already being inherently faulty, 
Demjanjuk argued that the lapse in time made this testimony even more 
so.310 The District Court disagreed, providing the following rationale: 
[A]nyone who underwent this shock, and experienced the terrible 
reality of the Treblinka extermination camp, cannot forget what his 
eyes have seen . . . All the identifying witnesses from among the 
Holocaust survivors who have testified that they identify Ivan the 
Terrible from Treblinka, were near him, and close to him, day after 
day, month after month . . . the powerful store of impressions which 
these people kept within themselves relating to the image of Ivan the 
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Terrible, is strong, and has been preserved through the course of 
time.311 
Indeed, the District Court determined that, given the nature of the 
atrocities committed, it would be impossible for anyone subjected to 
them to forget the details, essentially finding the testimony of these six 
witnesses to be even more relevant and credible.  
In addition to this eyewitness testimony, the prosecution submitted 
documentary evidence, the primary piece being Demjanjuk’s SS service 
certificate.312 The service certificate indicated that Demjanjuk had 
served as an SS guard in the Trawniki training center, and in the Lublin 
district of occupied Poland.313 The Trawniki-trained guard unit worked 
in three extermination camps (Sobibor, Treblinka, and Belzec); 
however, the majority of its members were stationed at the Treblinka 
extermination camp.314 Despite the service card placing Demjanjuk at a 
work farm (L.G. Okzow) and the Sobibor extermination camp, the court 
determined that the majority of Trawniki unit members were stationed 
at Treblinka, and that this fact, together with the eyewitness testimony, 
established that Demjanjuk was indeed Ivan the Terrible.315 In 1988, the 
District Court of Israel, after a 15-month trial, convicted Demjanjuk on 
all four counts of the indictment and sentenced him to death.316 
Demjanjuk appealed. 
b.  The Appeal 
Two years passed before the Israeli Supreme Court, or High Court 
of Justice, considered Demjanjuk’s appeal.317 On appeal, Demjanjuk 
continued to maintain that he was not Ivan the Terrible and introduced 
documents that became available from the Soviet archives after 1991, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.318 Among them were 
documents concerning Treblinka and the guards who served there, none 
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of which listed Demjanjuk.319 Instead, the documents revealed a guard 
by the name of Ivan Marchenko, a gas chamber operator, who was 
known for being a “particularly cruel police auxiliary.”320 This evidence 
was sufficient to raise reasonable doubt and on July 29, 1993, the High 
Court acquitted Demjanjuk of all charges.321  
At a lecture regarding the doctrine of “reasonable doubt,” United 
States Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman322 described the High Court’s 
decision to acquit Demjanjuk, because of reasonable doubt that he was 
"Ivan the Terrible", as a “courageous decision,” and commended the 
High Court for “[taking] the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard seriously.”323 
The High Court indicated that it acquitted Demjanjuk because the 
indictment rested primarily on Demjanjuk being Ivan the Terrible at 
Treblinka, and for the acts committed there.324 The evidence produced 
during the appeal, however, established that Demjanjuk might not be 
Ivan the Terrible from Treblinka.325 Although evidence introduced at the 
trial level indicated that Demjanjuk had served at Sobibor, the High 
Court determined that it would not pursue alternative charges for 
Demjanjuk’s service there. The documentary evidence and live 
testimony produced at trial were introduced for the purpose of 
establishing that Demjanjuk served at Treblinka, not Sobibor.326  
Just one month before the High Court released its decision to 
acquit Demjanjuk in June 1993, it was discovered that the United States 
Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”) had withheld information that 
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also indicated that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the Terrible.327 It appears 
that OSI had this information as early as 1979, yet withheld it from the 
Israeli government.328 The release of this information could have 
changed the course of the Demjanjuk trial in Israel because Israel could 
have focused the basis of the indictment on Demjanjuk’s actual service 
at Sobibor, instead of the alleged service at Treblinka. Such a change in 
course would have avoided the District Court’s heavy reliance on 
eyewitness testimony, the imputation of meaning to a document that 
failed to list service at Treblinka, and ultimately, an acquittal.  
Subsequent to the High Court’s decision, the Attorney General of 
Israel declined to re-indict Demjanjuk, much to the dismay of Holocaust 
survivors and a young political activist named Noam Federman, who 
filed a petition to the High Court to re-try Demjanjuk and delay 
Demjanjuk’s release.329 The High Court granted a stay order holding 
Demjanjuk pending the outcome of the petition.330 Upon reviewing the 
petition, the High Court affirmed the Attorney General’s decision not to 
re-try Demjanjuk, citing that the Attorney General had acted within his 
legitimate discretion, and terminated the stay of deportation.331 
Demjanjuk was detained in Israel for over seven years.332 Of this trial, 
Israeli Judge Haim Cohen later wrote: “It was a spectacle for the people. 
Any resemblance to justice was purely coincidental.”333  
Whether Demjanjuk was originally wrongfully convicted in Israel 
for being Ivan the Terrible remains an open question. As explained at 
that time by Alex Kozinsky, currently Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a child of Holocaust 
survivors: 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to free Demjanjuk rests on two 
key rulings. The first concerns the sufficiency of the evidence that 
Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible – the operator of the Treblinka gas 
chamber where thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Jewish 
men, women and children perished. This, the court held, was not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the court decided not to 
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pursue the lesser charges that Demjanjuk served as a guard at the 
extermination camp at Sobibor and the concentration camps at 
Flossenbuerg and Regensbuerg—charges the court found were 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, indeed beyond all doubt. An 
American court would probably have ruled otherwise on both 
issues.334 
Following this decision, Demjanjuk returned to the United States, 
only to face a second round of denaturalization proceedings, initiated in 
1999.335 This time, the basis for denaturalization was Demjanjuk’s 
service as a guard at Sobibor, Majdanek, and Trawniki.336 In 2002, 
Demjanjuk officially lost his American citizenship, and in 2004 
deportation proceedings began, which resulted in a 2005 court order to 
deport Demjanjuk to his native Ukraine.337 Demjanjuk’s appeals were 
rejected, and in 2008, the United States Supreme Court declined 
review.338 That same year, Germany became interested in prosecuting 
Demjanjuk for his service at Sobibor.339 The German extradition 
request, and indeed its interest in prosecuting Demjanjuk, was described 
by legal scholar Lawrence Douglas as Germany’s attempt “‘to correct 
the mistakes made earlier by the German government’ for failing to try 
more Nazi perpetrators.”340 
In May 2009, Demjanjuk was removed from the United States to 
Germany, where he was arrested and charged with approximately 
28,000 counts of accessory to murder at Sobibor.341 Rather than building 
its case predominantly on eyewitness testimony, as Israeli prosecutors 
had, German prosecutors produced various wartime documents that 
evidenced Demjanjuk’s service at Sobibor—likely similar to the 
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documents that led to Demjanjuk’s acquittal in Israel.342 On May 12, 
2011, Demjanjuk was convicted on all counts and sentenced to five 
years in prison, receiving two years of credit for time served.343 
Demjanjuk was released pending the appeal of his conviction, and 
moved to a nursing home.344 At that time, he was suffering from a 
variety of ailments, most seriously chronic kidney and bone-marrow 
disease. On March 17, 2012 he died, likely as a result of these ailments 
and old age, being just shy of 92.345  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Demjanjuk was the last person tried under the NNCL. Though it 
remains officially on the books, the law is a dead letter. The rapidly 
diminishing population of both Holocaust victims and perpetrators 
means that there will be no other prosecutions under the NNCL.  
During its life, the NNCL captured worldwide attention and legal 
interest through the Eichmann trial. Though it originated under 
checkered circumstances in 1950, its availability in 1961 following 
Eichmann’s capture made it possible for Israel to prosecute Eichmann 
under national legislation already on the books and covering specifically 
the acts committed by him. 
A national law targeting specifically perpetrators of the genocide 
of the Jews during the Shoah—“Crimes Against the Jewish People”—
and its use by Israel against Eichmann serves as precedent that genocide 
of any group is a universal crime for which its perpetrators become 
hostis human generis, enemies of all mankind and thereby subject to 
prosecution anywhere they are caught. 
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